INTRODUCTION
On October 21, 2015 after a Citron Research (2015) report by Andrew Left, a short seller, alleged fraud and compared Valeant to Enron, Valeant's stock plunged as much as 40% or $60 from its opening $150 price. By the end of that day, Valeant's stock price had recovered to close at $118.61 after the company immediately responded to this Citron Research report but Valeant's market capitalization decline on just this one day was $10.8 billion or 26%. On March 31, 2016 , Valeant failed to file its 2015 10-K report, an annual report of financial statements to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), on time which violated its banks' loan covenants. However, these banks (with $30 billion of loans to Valeant) waived the right to call these loans. By April 2017, its stock price was down to $9.02 (with a market cap of $3 billion) from its highest stock price of $257.50 in July, 2015 (with a market cap of $89 billion). Valeant's market cap destruction was $86 billion (a 97% decrease), which exceeded Enron's $78 billion market cap destruction and Enron was ranked the biggest fraud of this century by Forbes (2013) . In early 2017, Valeant was selling off $5 billion of its product line assets to reduce its debt to $25 billion (Mattioli, Beneoit, and Rockoff, 2017) .
As global stock markets have expanded with more companies and more investors in this century, large market cap destructions have been occurring more frequently, especially facilitated by fraudulent financial statements. In addition to the 2000 Enron $78 billion destruction, $295 billion was destroyed by the 2001 WorldCom, Qwest, and Global Crossing telecom frauds, $60 billion by the 2002 Tyco fraud, $50 billion by the 2003 HealthSouth fraud, $13 billion by the Satyam fraud ("Asia's Enron") and $5 billion by Parmalat ("Europe's Enron") (Grove, 2007 (Grove, -2016 . Also, the 2007-2011 initial public offerings (IPOs) and reverse merger frauds of 100 Chinese companies, listing on U.S. stock exchanges, destroyed $40 billion (McKinsey and Company, 2013) . The tipping point of the 2008 worldwide recession, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, destroyed $32 billion and the estimated market cap destruction from the entire recession was $1 trillion.
Once again, with these new century frauds destroying well over one trillion of market capitalization and now with Valeant's 2016 market cap destruction of $86 billion, the question must be asked: where were the gatekeepers (boards of directors, regulators, sell-side financial analysts, and auditors) to protect investors? Many of these frauds were caught only by short sellers, such as Jim Chanos ( 
LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FAILURE AT VALEANT
The failure of corporate governance by Valeant's board of directors was summarized by Richard Davis (2016), a corporate governance and information technology consultant:
"Where were the information and corporate governance checks and balances? Why did it take a report by an activist short seller to reveal this massive alleged fraud? Simply put, had solid information and corporation governance discipline and technologies been in place, a thoughtful outside or independent director would have been able to discover this information long before the Citron Research report and taken action to remediate the resulting governance lapses."
He further argued that proactive corporate governance is much more efficient, as well as capital preserving, than reactive forensic analysis as a discovery function of fraudulent practices. Such forensic analysis has a significantly higher cost and risk of company disruption. Davis concluded that "What happened at Valeant can be described as an epic corporate governance failure" and predicted that subsequent forensic analysis will find that the high integrity management touted in Valeant investor presentations will be shown to have been a sham. "The net result is that an independent board with the requisite resources could have identified and headed off the behaviors that caused this debacle." He advocated for proactive, independent monitoring and analysis of common corporate data sources which would have minimum adverse impact to company operations. Valeant was certainly an example of reactive, not proactive, corporate governance when its board of directors established an Investigative Committee two days after the key Citron Research report came out. This paper develops key procedures for such independent monitoring and analysis of a company's operations on a proactive corporate governance basis by a company's board of directors, rather than the more costly and disruptive, reactive forensic analysis basis. These procedures rely heavily on the work of various short sellers and financial analysts who blew the whistle on many of the major frauds of the 21 st Century, including the Chinese IPO and reverse merger frauds (Chanos, 2014 A research study (Cooper et al., 2013) analyzed executive compensation for the S&P 1500 firms over the 1994-2011 period and concluded: "We find evidence that CEO pay is negatively related to future stock returns for periods up to three years after sorting on pay. For example, firms that pay their CEOs in the top ten percent of excess (incentive) pay earn negative abnormal returns over the next three years of approximately 8%. The effect is stronger for CEOs who receive higher incentive pay relative to their peers. Our results appear to be driven by highpay induced CEO overconfidence that leads to shareholder wealth losses from activities such as overinvestment and value-destroying mergers and acquisitions." Similarly, the CEOs of collapsed, fraudulent companies gradually slid into the intent to deceive "as hubris consumed them and they did whatever it took to maintain their unique and revered status in the marketplace" (Jennings, 2006) . The Greek term hubris describes a personality quality of extreme or foolish pride or dangerous overconfidence. Hubris often indicates a loss of contact with reality and an overestimation of one's own competence, accomplishments or capabilities.
Such overconfidence was displayed by the Valeant CEO, Michael Pearson, who still has $388 million of deferred compensation, mainly common shares vested but not delivered per the Valeant 2015 Proxy Statement. From his former billionaire status, Pearson lost $750 million in the last year and his net worth is now only $175 million (Scott, 2016). A compensation consultant criticized Valeant board members for such stock grants to top executives and said they should have used a more modest and balanced program (Rapoport and Lublin, 2016) . Also, Pearson ignored advice from his management team to go slow on price increases on drugs from acquired companies, successfully lobbying for single, sharp price increases. For example, the day Valeant completed a February 10, 2015 purchase of the heart drug, Nitropress, the price was tripled ((McNish and Hoffman, 2016). Such a pricing strategy appears to reinforce a focus upon shortterm compensation for both executives and board members as the nine outside board members had total 2014 compensation of $4,134,000 of which $3,572,000 or 86% was in stock awards. The $460,000 average 2014 board compensation for Valeant was almost twice the average U.S. board compensation of $240,000. In summary, overall corporate governance appeared to be weak with several problems indicated by these key research variables concerning corporate governance.
Valeant did acknowledge corporate governance problems when it issued an 8-K report to the SEC on March 21, 2016 
ANOTHER RISK FACTOR: INSIDER STOCK SALES AT VALEANT
Insider stock sales can be another risk factor for corporate governance problems. In response to the problem of insider stock sales during the frauds of the early 2000s, the 2002 U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) required the prompt reporting of such sales within four days on a Form 4 to the SEC, as opposed to the prior requirement of ten days after the month-end when such insider stock sales were made. One prominent pre-SOX example was Enron where the current and former CEOs, Jeff Skilling and Kenneth Lay, were both selling their own shares while telling investors that Enron's stock was undervalued at $90 and heading toward $120, i.e. the "pump and dump" strategy. In total, Enron insiders sold over $1 billion of their Enron stock just before its collapse in 2001. Financial analysts called such behavior a "screaming" red flag or risk factor for Enron (Grove et al. 2004 February 18, 2016 , the former CFO, Howard Schiller, sold over 54,000 shares for almost $5 million. Four months earlier than this key Citron report, on June 10, 2015 a Valeant board director and hedge fund co-founder, Jeffrey Ubben, sold 4.2 million shares for over $944 million. He has been criticized as a "bad activist" investor who does not have the best interests of investors in mind by focusing upon short-term financial engineering to "make the numbers", rather than substantive plans to improve operating performance. Such "bad activist" investors are likely in the stock for shortterm returns with little concern for creating longterm shareholder value (Trainer, 2016 ), which appears to be a good fit with Valeant's business model and strategy. 
To emphasize the ongoing nature of this insider stock sale problem, the Equifax Chief Financial Officer and two other senior executives sold almost $2 million of Equifax stock once they learned about the hack of 143 million Americans' credit information at Equifax, well before the hack become public on September 7, 2017 (Cole, 2017) . In the following one week from September 7 to September 13, the Equifax stock fell from $142.72 to $97.50 or $45.22, a 32% drop. Over twenty-five lawsuits have subsequently been filed against Equifax.
RELATED ETHICAL FAILURES AT VALEANT
Related non-financial risk factors concerning ethical problems are analyzed for Valeant. A key procedure is an investigation of a company's ethical practices. The U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging has been investigating companies that raised prices on old drugs to exorbitant levels and had a hearing on April 27, 2016. The terminated Valeant CEO, Michael Pearson, conceded mistakes on favoring profits over patients' needs and said: "I regret pursuing transactions where a central premise was a planned increase in the prices of medicines." One Senator commented that the company's policy was "using patients as hostages. It's immoral. It hurt real people" . Per the October 2, 2015 Citron Research report, Valeant's cumulative price increases as of February 10, 2015 for the heart drugs, Isuprel and Nitropress, were 525% and 212%, respectively. They were the two biggest contributors to EBITDA in the first quarter of 2015 per internal Valeant emails revealed by an investigation of the U.S. House Oversight Committee (Grant, 2016) . Also, concerning ethics, the former CFO has accused of improper conduct by Valeant.
Valeant is facing multiple federal investigations for its practice of buying companies, slashing costs by firing employees of those companies, and raising prices, as well as its relationship to the mail-order pharmacy, Philidor. Valeant has since cut ties with Philidor, another red flag, which seems to confirm the negative Citron report concerning Valeant's relationship with Philidor. At this Senate Committee hearing, a doctor testified about a Wilson's disease medication that has been available for 50 years and costs just $100 in Europe but now over $300,000 per year in the U.S. after Valeant acquired the drug company and raised the price of this drug: "We're not just talking about costs here. Some patients who do not get these drugs can die. We're talking about human lives if they don't get access to the drugs." Another doctor testified that a liver transplant, an alternative treatment for Wilson's disease, is now cheaper that a lifetime of Valeant drugs (McNish and Hoffman, 2016).
At this Senate Committee hearing, another one Senator commented: "These enormous and unwarranted price hikes have had far-ranging and severe impacts on patients, hospitals, and our health care system. Valeant's monopoly model operates at the expense of real people." Valeant's new CEO then pledged to offer hospitals price breaks up to 30% on Isuprel and Nitropress, two of its expensive heart drugs, though large U.S. group purchasing organizations, Ascension, Premier, and MedAssets, which negotiate prices on behalf of hospitals. However, three weeks after this Senate Committee hearing, only two of Premier's 2,500 member hospitals had received these 30% discounts and a Premier spokeswoman said "the percentage of hospitals getting the discount was so low because it only applies to very high volume purchases." Furthermore, the Mayo Clinic, the Cleveland Clinic and New York-Presbyterian, all top-ranked heart hospitals, do not qualify for the discounts because they do not use any group purchasing organizations. One hospital chief pharmacy officer commented: "they raised the price 800% and they are going to give 30%? It is still not enough, compared to the egregious price increases they have done" . A venture capitalist observed: "Jacking up prices of old drugs with no R&D risk-taking is just not right" (Pollack and Tavernise, 2015) .
Since the U.S. is the only developed country without some form of control over drug pricing, the U.S. has the highest drug prices in the world . The only hope to check such unrestrained drug price increases may be the Valeant class action lawsuit, not any new U.S. laws. Unfortunately, there continues to be a "do-nothing" U.S. Congress, especially since these elected officials often spend four hours a day telemarketing for campaign contributions per a 60 Minutes investigative report aired in April 2016.
As 
RELATED LEGAL PROBLEMS AT VALEANT
Related legal problems from these corporate governance and ethical problems are analyzed. One procedure is reading a company's legal proceedings footnote in its 10-K report. Valeant's legal footnote began with the customary cautionary tones: "From time to time, the Company becomes involved in various legal and administrative proceedings, which include product liability, intellectual property, commercial, antitrust, governmental and regulatory investigations, related private litigation and ordinary course employment-related issues. From time to time, the Company also initiates actions or files counterclaims. The Company could be subject to counterclaims or other suits in response to actions it may initiate. The Company believes that the prosecution of these actions and counterclaims is important to preserve and protect the Company, its reputation and its assets. Unless otherwise indicated, the Company cannot reasonably predict the outcome of these legal proceedings, nor can it estimate the amount of loss, or range of loss, if any, that may result from these proceedings. An adverse outcome in certain of these proceedings could have a material adverse effect on the Company's business, financial condition and results of operations, and could cause the market value of its common shares to decline."
A review of Valeant's 2014 legal proceedings footnote of nine pages revealed litigations in 24 investigations and lawsuits, only one of which has been settled. So many lawsuits indicate a risk factor for the company's business operations. There were government and regulatory investigations for a Massachusetts anti-kickback statue, a U.S. Federal trade Commission patent infringement with a generic drug manufacturer, a U.S. Department of Health and Human Services questionable drug payments with medical professionals, and a U.S. Department of Justice civil and criminal agreement which required a Valeant affiliate to create a compliance and ethics program for three years. Also, there were five securities class action lawsuits, one antitrust lawsuit, eleven intellectual property lawsuits, including brand names versus generics and patent infringement cases, one general civil action for misrepresenting cold medicine benefits, one employment lawsuit involving female gender discrimination, and one product liability lawsuit for personal injury from using content lens solutions.
On October 23, 2015, two days after the key Citron Research report came out, a class action complaint for violations of the Federal Securities Laws was filed on behalf of Valeant shareholders. According to the law firm press release, the lawsuit alleges that the defendants, Valeant, the former CEO, and both CFOs, issued materially false and misleading statements to investors and/or failed to disclose ten key items, such as deficient internal controls, a relationship with a network of specialty pharmacies used to boost Valeant's sales of its highpriced drugs and related financial performance, and Valeant's true relationship in controlling Philidor. The lawsuit further charged that defendants were engaged in a scheme to manipulate Valeant's stock price and, as a result, Valeant's public statements were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times. The entire key October 21, 2015 Citron Research Report was included in the class action complaint. No amount for damages was provided, just "compensatory damages for all damages sustained as a result of defendants' wrongdoing in an amount to be proven at trial, including interest thereon" (Stanford, 2015) .
In its 2015 10-K, Valeant disclosed new investigations by state regulators in North Carolina for drug pricing and in New Jersey for the Philidor relationship. Federal prosecutors in New York and Massachusetts were already investigating Valeant for drug pricing and are now also investigating the Philidor relationship. One U.S. Senate and one U.S. House of Representatives Congressional committees are also investigating these issues (Rapoport and McNish, 2016 ).
PROACTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROCEDURES APPLIED TO VALEANT
To help with identifying bad behavior, Jim Chanos, the billionaire short seller, recommended a "wonderful" checklist, the Seven Signs of Ethical Collapse in an organization (Parramore, 2013) . These seven signs are: pressure to maintain numbers, fear of silence, young 'uns and a bigger-than-life CEO, weak board, conflicts, innovation like no other, and goodness in some areas atoning for evil in others (Jennings, 2006) . The recommended proactive procedures here do consider most of these seven signs and frequently rely on SEC reports as a starting point. Also, Andrew Left, another short seller, has warned analysts, as well as board members, to investigate their concerns without starting with the phrase: "after discussions with management" in an attempt to improve the quality of evidence and analysis (Left, 2011 5. An analysis of SEC comment letters issued for Valeant revealed ongoing revenue recognition and disclosure problems as far back as at least 2012.
6. On recent Form 4 reports to the SEC, an examination of insider trading in the six months from November 2015 through April 2016 revealed that both executives and institutions selling shares (net of minor purchases) of 4.3 million and 13.0 million, respectively.
7. An examination of the Valeant DEF14A proxy statement reports to the SEC revealed many key corporate governance weaknesses, such as the CEO duality problem, unexpected terminations and resignations of top executives and board members, lack of board diversity, a majority of older directors, and focus on short-term incentive compensation for both top executives and board members. Valeant's 8-K report on March 21, 2016 did acknowledge corporate governance problems, primarily the "tone at the top" and the short-term performance-based compensation focus contributing to the channel stuffing problems. 10. Additional follow-up procedures included the comparisons of Valeant's reporting to different government entities, which revealed a significant difference in income tax rates: 16% in its 10-K financial reports versus 9% in its tax reports. Both rates were very low as Valeant was the first U.S. pharmaceutical company to do the tax inversion strategy by relocating to Canada. Another follow-up procedure found increasing credit default swap spreads on Valeant's debt of $31 billion, which implied a 43% probability of default on such debt. 4. Heightened scrutiny from auditors that will extend through all Valeant's distribution channels, including the entire "consolidated" Philidor network, as well as Europe.
CONCLUSION
5. Earnings restatements -How can these possibly be avoided, given the volume of manipulated prescriptions?
6. Responding to dozens of subpoenas and whatever charges come from the investigations.
7. The end of Valeant's drug price increase strategy.
8. The end of Valeant's acquisition strategy. 9. Eroding revenue base across nearly all product lines due to reputational damage. All drugs are melting "ice cubes" due to improved treatments, generic competition, and aging patents. All this reputational damage simply accelerates the rate at which Valeant's "ice cubes" melt.
10. Vulnerability to unfavorable tax treatment rulings from the U.S. as well as Canadian tax authorities, which are conducting reviews of several years of Valeant's past returns as well as going forward.
11. Dramatically increasing credit default swap spreads on Valeant's debt which implies a 43% probability of default. Will Valeant be able to generate sufficient cash to serve its $31 billion debt load resulting from its pharma company leveraged acquisition strategy?
All eleven of these concerns can be related to, and reinforce, the deficiencies and failures of corporate governance by Valeant's board of directors. This entire paper can be used for lessons learned from such corporate governance failures which have resulted in $86 billion market value destruction for investors. Enron, Forbes's number one fraud of this century, had a similar $78 billion market cap destruction and similar corporate governance failures, as pointed out by the 2015 Citron Research report, which labelled Valeant as the "Pharmaceutical Enron". How many times must lessons to be learned be relearned, as in these similar year 2000 and year 2016 corporate failures?
A good starting point to correct such failures and market cap destructions would be for any board of directors to use these ten recommended investigatory procedures here for sustainable or proactive, rather than reactive, corporate governance.
The sustainability of corporate governance principles would be enhanced. A corporate governance consultant concluded: "Simply put, had solid information and corporate governance discipline and technologies been in place, a thoughtful outside or independent director would have been able to discover this information long before the 2015 Citron Research report and taken action to remediate the resulting governance lapses" (Davis, 2016) .
